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#2A-9/ 15/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. E-1417 
Upon the application for designation of 
persons as managerial or confidential. 
DAVID S. SHAW, ESQ. (DAVID S. SHAW, ESQ. and 
GARRETT L. SILVEIRA, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Petitioner 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Respondent)'to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) which granted the 
application of the Newburgh Enlarged City School (District) for 
designation of Gail Clark, secretary to the Superintendent of 
Buildings and Grounds, as confidential in accordance with the 
criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) 
The Director found, after hearing, that Clark is the only 
clerical employee in the Buildings and Grounds Department, which 
is supervised by Raymond Cox, Superintendent of Buildings and 
•i/The designation of another employee, Rose Colbert, secretary to 
the Director of the Newburgh Public Library, as confidential, is 
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Grounds, and which includes between 100 and 125 full- and part-
time employees. The Director based his designation of Clark as a 
confidential employee upon Cox's responsibility for personnel 
administration, contract administration, and participation in 
negotiating processes. CSEA claims that the testimony fails to 
support a finding that Cox meets any of these three criteria for 
managerial status and that the application for Clark's 
designation as confidential must accordingly be denied. 
In the area of personnel administration, Cox testified that 
he is responsible for recommending the hiring and firing of 
buildings and grounds personnel, usually in conjunction with 
recommendations from principals of schools within the District. 
Cox further testified that he gathers facts and makes 
recommendations to Alan DiCesare, Assistant Superintendent for 
Personnel, concerning possible disciplinary action against 
employees in the Buildings and Grounds Department, although 
notice of disciplinary action is issued by DiCesare. In those 
instances in which Buildings and Grounds employees are employed 
at specific schools, the principals of those schools prepare such 
recommendations themselves. Finally, with respect to personnel 
administration, Cox testified that he has been responsible for 
preparing documentation in support of a recommendation to create 
a new position, which would be submitted to the Assistant 
Superintendent for Business. 
In the area of contract negotiations, Cox testified that he 
has, in conjunction with the most recent round of negotiations, 
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submitted some written recommendations for negotiation proposals 
relating to the Buildings and Grounds Department to the persons 
responsible for conducting negotiations, but that he does not 
participate directly in negotiations himself. He further 
testified that he has been asked on at least one occasion to 
comment on negotiation proposals which impact upon the Buildings 
and Grounds Department. 
In the area of contract administration, the testimony 
establishes that Cox is responsible for issuing decisions at the 
first written step of the grievance procedure, which proceeds to 
DiCesare, as designee of the Superintendent of Schools, the Board 
of Education, and finally arbitration. The extent of Cox's 
involvement in contract administration beyond the first written 
step (the first step consisting of an oral grievance to the 
immediate supervisor), is the provision of additional detail and 
support to DiCesare for the position taken at the step handled by 
Cox within the Buildings and Grounds Department. 
Cox's uncontroverted testimony establishes that Clark is the 
only person responsible for typing, filing, and transmitting 
written material to and from Cox in connection with the foregoing 
matters. 2/ 
Section 201.7(a) of the Act instructs us that "employees may 
be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist 
and act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees 
2JThere is no testimony or argument that Clark assists or acts in 
a confidential capacity to any other person, such as DiCesare. 
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described in clause (ii)." Clause (ii) provides that employees 
may be designated as managerial only if they are persons 
who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public 
employer to assist directly in the preparation for and 
conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major 
role in the administration of agreements or in 
personnel administration provided that such role is not 
of a routine or clerical nature and requires the 
exercise of independent judgment. 
This statutory language, when taken together, clearly means 
that a person may be designated as confidential only if he or she 
assists and acts in a confidential capacity to a person who 
either has been designated managerial or would be entitled to 
such designation on the basis of the managerial employee's 
participation in collective negotiations, contract adminis-
tration, or personnel administration. In order to prevail on 
this application, therefore, the District has the burden of 
proving that Cox is a managerial employee and that Clark assists 
and acts in a confidential capacity to him in the exercise of his 
managerial functions. 
In State of New York. 5 PERB f3001 (1972), this Board 
examined and explicated the criteria for designation of an 
employee as managerial in some detail. Subsequent decisions 
issued by the Director, such as City of Bincrhamton. 12 PERB 54022 
(1979), have followed our analysis in State of New York, supra. 
As the Director stated in City of Bincrhamton. 12 PERB 54022, 
at p. 4035: 
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To satisfy the second criterion, participation in 
collective negotiations, an employee must be a direct 
participant in the preparation of the employer's 
proposals and positions in collective negotiations and 
an active participant in the negotiating process 
itself. Acting as an observer or resource person 
either at the table or in caucuses is insufficient. 
Ibid at p. 4035. (emphasis added) 
The evidence.that_Cox has, on occasion, made recommendations 
concerning possible negotiation proposals concerning the 
Buildings and Grounds Department and has, on occasion, commented 
upon proposals which affect the Buildings and Grounds Department 
is insufficient to establish the direct and active participation 
in the negotiating process required by §201.7(a)(ii) of the Act. 
Similarly, the evidence that Cox deals with contract 
grievances at the first written level and may provide additional 
information to DiCesare for consideration at the second 
(Superintendent of Schools) level, fails to meet the criterion of 
exercising a major role in the administration of agreements, 
beyond that of a routine or clerical nature. As stated by the 
Director in City of Binghamton, supra, at p. 4035: 
[An employee] must have the authority to exercise 
independent judgement in effecting changes in the 
employer's procedures or methods of operation as 
necessitated by the implementation of agreements. 
Participation in the first level of the contract 
grievance procedures does not meet this criterion, 
(emphasis added). 
There is no evidence that Cox, at the step of the grievance 
procedure for which he is responsible, has the authority to 
exercise this type of independent judgment. 
Finally, with respect to the criterion of exercising a major 
11730 
E-1417 - Board -6 
role in personnel administration, Cox's preparation of material 
and recommendations for hiring and disciplinary actions and for 
the creation of new positions is an inadequate basis upon which 
it can be said that he is a managerial, as opposed to a 
supervisory, employee. Although Cox testified, in general terms, 
that he has responsibility for personnel administration in his 
department, the lack of specificity and proofs on this point 
provides us with no satisfactory basis on which to conclude that 
he does indeed meet this criterion. See City of Binghamton, 
supra, at p. 4035, and discussion of Building and Maintenance 
Superintendent and other positions at pp. 4036-4037. 
Having failed to establish, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Cox meets any of the criteria for designation as 
managerial, the District is not entitled to a determination that 
Clark should be afforded confidential status.^-/ 
-2/The District argues that even if the Director erred in 
determining that Cox is a managerial employee, the decision of 
the Director should be affirmed on the theory that Cox is a 
confidential employee and Clark should also be so designated 
since the secretarial position cannot reasonably be insulated 
from exposure to Cox's confidential work, citing our decision in 
Washinatonville CSD, 16 PERB fl3017 (1983). To the extent that 
Washinqtonville may be interpreted as indicating that a 
confidential designation may rest solely upon a finding that the 
person to be so designated assists and acts in a confidential 
capacity to another confidential employee, we decline to follow 
it. However, implicit in our finding in that case is the 
conclusion that the person sought to be designated as 
confidential was claimed to assist and act in a confidential 
capacity to a managerial employee to whom another employee, 
already designated, reported. The clear language of §201.7(a) of 
the Act requires a showing that the person sought to be 
designated as confidential shall assist and act in a confidential 
capacity to a managerial employee, not to another confidential 
employee. 
11731 
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Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Director, 
insofar as it grants the District's application as to Gail Clark, 
Secretary to the Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds, is 
reversed. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the application, insofar as it 
relates to said position, is denied. 
DATED: September 16, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CONNETQUOT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT 
OF CSEA, LOCAL 870, AFSCME LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10092 
CONNETQUOT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
MARJORIE E. KAROWE, ESQ. (MARILYN S. DYMOND, ESQ., of 
Counsel) for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, HEIDELBERGER & 
REICH, ESQS. (JOHN H. GROSS, ESQ., of Counsel) for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Connetquot 
Central School District Unit of CSEA, Local 870, AFSCME Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the dismissal of a charge against the 
Connetquot Central School District (District) which alleges that 
the District violated §§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) in that at a certain 
meeting, District "officials stated that they were not going to 
adhere to the contract language because that language provides 
for a payment that was not contemplated by the parties during 
11733 
U-10092 - Board 
-2 
negotiations."-^ The Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the charge as deficient upon 
the ground that the charge raises nothing more than an alleged 
breach of a collective bargaining agreement, and is accordingly 
beyond the jurisdiction of this Board as limited by §205.5(d) of 
the Act.-2/ 
In its exceptions, CSEA alleges that the determination of 
the District not to make certain payments allegedly required by 
the collective bargaining agreement executed by the parties on or 
about March 15, 1988, amounts to a repudiation of the agreement, 
and that the repudiation of an agreement violates the duty to 
negotiate in good faith. CSEA observes that where a repudiation 
of an agreement is found, this Board has consistently held it to 
constitute a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
3/ 
At issue before us, then, is whether the Director correctly 
construed the District's actions, as set forth in the charge, as 
a statement of intention to breach a collective bargaining 
agreement or whether, as alleged by CSEA, the District's action 
constitutes a repudiation of an agreement. 
i/CSEA does not except to the dismissal of the charge insofar as 
it alleges a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
•^Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides in relevant part 
as follows: "[T]he Board shall not have authority to 
enforce an agreement... and shall not exercise jurisdiction 
over an alleged violation of such an agreement that would not 
otherwise constitute an improper...practice." 
•2/see Copiaque UFSD. 13 PERB J[3081 (1980) ; Addison CSD. 17 PERB 
H[3076 (1984) ; Honeove CSD. 18 PERB J[3085 (1985) ; City of Buffalo, 
19 PERB 13023 (1986). 
11734 
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We find that the Director properly dismissed the charge as 
deficient because what is alleged by CSEA is that the District 
stated its intention at a meeting on March 18, 1988, not to 
comply with a specific term of the collective bargaining 
agreement concededly reached between the parties. What CSEA 
seeks in the charge before us is a determination that it is 
entitled to enforcement of the terms of its collective bargaining 
agreement with the District. Section 205.5(d) of the Act 
precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by this Board not only in 
those situations in which a difference of opinion exists between 
the parties concerning the proper interpretation of their 
agreement, but also in those situations in which mere enforcement 
of the agreement is sought. A contractual procedure for 
enforcement of a term of the collective bargaining agreement 
exists, and there is no claim that the District denies the 
existence of an agreement or its contractual obligation under 
circumstances demonstrating no colorable claim of contractual 
entitlement. In the absence of such claims, it cannot be said 
that the charge sets forth a claim of repudiation of an agreement 
over which this Board would have jurisdiction. 
4/ 
4/For the purpose of our determination, we rely exclusively upon 
the allegations contained in the charge, together with the 
written information submitted to the Director's designee by CSEA. 
In so doing, we place no reliance upon any factual allegations 
made by the District in support of the Director's decision, after 
the Director's decision was issued. 
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The decision of the Director is accordingly affirmed, and IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed 
in its entirety. 
DATED: September 16, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb j£r 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAVERLY POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9Q52 
VILLAGE OF WAVERLY, 
Respondent. 
JOHN B. SCHAMEL, for,Charging Party 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQS. (EDWARD J. SARZYNSKI, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 18, 1986, the Waverly Police Association 
(Association) filed an improper practice charge alleging, 
among other things not now before us, a violation of §2 09-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
the Village of Waverly (Village) by the unilateral adoption, 
on September 23, 1986, of a Police Officers Manual For Rules 
and Regulations Departmental Policy (Manual). The 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) found some of the items 
contained in the Manual to constitute mandatory subjects of 
bargaining and issued a Decision and Recommended Order 
accordingly. The Village does not except to any of the ALJ's 
findings with respect to the Village's duty to negotiate, but 
excepts to certain portions of the ALJ Decision and 
Recommended Order which provide for remedial relief. In 
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particular, the Village excepts to the order to expunge any 
material in the records of bargaining unit members relating 
to a failure to comply with portions of the Manual found to 
be mandatorily negotiable and to the order to post notice of 
the remedial relief required by the Decision and Recommended 
Order. 
The Village bases its exceptions to the remedial 
portions of the ALT decision on a stipulation which was 
entered into between the parties at a hearing held on 
January 14, 1988. The stipulation, recited by the ALT for 
the record and specifically agreed to by the representatives 
for each party, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
The Police Association will file with me, with a 
copy to Mr. Sarzynski, by February 5, a copy of the 
Rules and Regulations and a written listing of 
those items alleged to be "mandatory" by the 
Association. I will then set a date for the filing 
of briefs approximately February 19, in which the 
parties will put their legal arguments with respect 
to the mandatory nature of those items, and I will 
then issue a decision regarding which, if any, of 
the Rules and Regulations deal with mandatory 
subjects of negotiations. The parties have 
stipulated that once they receive that decision 
they will negotiate with respect to those [sic] 
items found to be [sic] mandatory. And the Village 
has further stipulated with respect to those items 
found by PERB to be mandatory, those items will be 
negotiated and will be rescinded from the 
Department Rules and Regulations at that time. 
The Village asserts that it entered into the foregoing 
stipulation with the understanding that the ALJ decision 
would only "provide guidance" or constitute an advisory 
opinion to the parties about whether items contained in the 
11738 
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Manual are mandatory subjects of negotiations or not. It 
alleges that had it known that a Decision and Recommended 
Order would issue, it would have sought to proceed to a 
hearing instead of entering into a stipulation which limited 
the record to the at-issue Manual. 
The issue before us, then, is whether the ALT Decision 
and Recommended Order violates the terms of the parties' 
stipulation and, if so, whether the remedial relief 
recommended by the ALT must be modified to accord with the 
stipulation. Alternatively, we can decide whether the 
parties1 stipulation should be rescinded on the basis of 
mutual mistake, and the parties returned to their original 
positions prior to the January 14, 1988 stipulation. 
At the outset, it is noted that a stipulation 
constitutes an agreement between the parties, not an 
agreement among the parties and this agency. Second, a 
stipulation entered into between the parties in an improper 
practice charge proceeding which would purport to limit 
PERB's authority to order remedial relief would be of 
questionable validity, in view of the statutory duty 
conferred upon PERB to order "such affirmative action as will 
effectuate the policies of this article . . . " (Section 
205.5(d) of the Act). 
Finally, even if such a stipulation could be binding 
upon PERB, the transcript of the hearing and documentary 
evidence in this case do not support the Village•s claim that 
1173 
Board - U-9052 -4 
an agreement was reached to limit the jurisdiction of the ALJ 
to a determination of whether certain subjects are mandatory 
or nonmandatory subjects of bargaining, with no authority to 
issue the remedial relief normally ordered upon such a 
determination. The fact that the stipulation speaks to 
rescission of the portions of the Manual found by PERB to be 
mandatory, and to negotiation on those subjects, does not 
compel the conclusion that the parties intended to preclude 
the ALT from ordering the complete relief customary in such 
cases. 
Indeed, in its brief to the ALJ, the Association 
specifically requested that specific remedial relief 
(including expungement and posting of a notice) issue upon a 
finding that any or all of the at-issue rules and regulations 
contained in the Manual are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
Furthermore, the Association, in its response to the 
exceptions, denies that an agreement was reached between the 
parties which limited the jurisdiction of the ALJ to an 
advisory opinion only, or which would have limited the 
remedial relief to be granted in the event of a finding of a 
violation of the Act. From these documents, it does not 
appear that the Association agrees with the Village in its 
understanding of the scope, purpose and meaning of the 
stipulation. In the absence of evidence of mutual mistake 
Board - U-9052 
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between the parties, rescission of the stipulation would not 
be appropriate. 
Further, in the absence of exceptions by the Village to 
the ALT's substantive findings concerning the mandatory 
nature of certain of the items contained in the Manual, we 
are not offered any grounds for a finding that the outcome of 
the instant charge would have been different had there been 
no stipulation between the parties. Accordingly, even 
accepting the Village's assertion that it would not have 
entered into the stipulation of January 14, 1988 had it known 
that a Decision and Recommended Order would issue, no basis 
is provided to indicate that the outcome would have been 
different. 
We find that the stipulation entered into between the 
parties and recited by the ALT is not fairly read to provide 
for the issuance of guidance or an advisory opinion only, but 
is framed in terms of the issuance of a "decision", as issued 
by the ALT. Quite apart from any inappropriate limitation in 
a stipulation by the parties, we also find that the 
stipulation makes no implicit or explicit attempt to preclude 
the ALT and/or this Board from ordering the relief contained 
in the ALT decision. 
i/see, generally, 37 NY Jur §5. 11741 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Decision and Recommended 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed in its 
entirety. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Village of Waverly: 
1. Rescind those sections of the Manual which deal 
with mandatory subjects of negotiation; 
2. Expunge any documents in its files relating to the 
failure of any unit employee to comply with any 
section of the manual herein found to be a 
mandatory subject of negotiation; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Association 
regarding mandatory subjects of negotiation; 
4. Post the attached notice at places normally used to 
communicate information to unit employees. 
DATED: September 16, 1988 
Albany, New York 
UOAA^ki ATT /V-UW-TI^^ 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chai rman 
ttUUz- r. 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies ol the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify All employees in the unit represented by the: 
Waverly Police Association that the Village of Waverly will 
1. Rescind those sections of the Police Officers 
Manual for Rules and Regulations Departmental 
Policy which deal with mandatory subjects of 
negotiation; 
2. Expunge any documents in its files relating to 
the failure of any unit employee to comply with 
any section of the Manual found to be a mandatory 
subject of negotiation; 
3= Negotiate in good faith with the Association 
regarding mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
Village of Waverly 
Dated By (Roprcuntativt) (Till.) 
This Notice must remain posted tor 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be alteret 
defaced, or covered by any other material. * * w J O 
#2D-9/15/88 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EVERETT PEAKE, et al.. 
Petitioners, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3404 
TOWN OF SWEDEN, 
Employer, 
-and-
S.E.I.U., LOCAL 200-C, 
• Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 25, 1988, Everett Peake, et al., filed a timely 
petition for decertification of S.E.I.U., Local 200-C 
(intervenor), the current negotiating representative for 
employees of the Town of Sweden in the following unit: 
Included: All full-time working foremen, automotive 
mechanics, motor equipment operators, truck 
drivers and laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, an on-site ballot election was 
held on August 22, 1988. The results of this election show that 
the majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid 
ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
11744 
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collective negotiations by the intervenor. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: September 16, 1988 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Lu<Uz-. ?> 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
1/ All eight ballots cast were against representation. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOCES 2, MAINTENANCE ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3392 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES, SECOND SUPERVISORY DISTRICT, 
MONROE-ORLEANS COUNTIES, 
Employer. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 4, 1988, the BOCES 2, Maintenance Association, NEA/NY 
(petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking 
certification as the negotiating representative of certain 
employees of the Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 
Second Supervisory District, Monroe-Orleans Counties (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: Maintenance Mechanic I, Maintenance 
Mechanic II, Maintenance Mechanic 
III, Custodian, Cleaner, 
Groundsman. 
Excluded: All supervisory employees and all 
other employees of the employer. 
Pursuant to that agreement a secret-ballot election was 
held, on August 9, 1988, at which 3 ballots were cast in favor of 
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representation by the petitioner and 8 ballots were case against 
representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 16, 1988 
Albany, New York 
/ < . A/LtfL^ < 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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